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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Kyle B. 
Anderson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On or about February 17, 2016, Kyle Anderson called his friend Stephanie 
Barker and asked to be picked up from the halfway house he was staying at.  
(Tr., p. 32, Ls. 8-20; p. 57, Ls. 12-13.)  Barker, along with Jacob Bittick, picked 
Anderson up, and they returned to Barker’s house, where they all used drugs.  
(Tr., p. 33, Ls. 6-19; p. 67, L. 4 – p. 68, L. 7.) 
 The next day, Anderson’s probation officer and local law enforcement 
went to Barker’s house to locate Anderson.  (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 1-18.)  They found 
Anderson and his belongings in the kitchen, and found nothing illegal after 
searching his person and his items.  (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 1-3; p. 16, L. 22 – p. 17, 
L. 17.)  However, Anderson admitted to his probation officer that he had used 
heroin the prior day.  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-15; p. 27, Ls. 18-25.)  The officer noted 
that Anderson had “track marks,” indicating intravenous illegal drug use, on his 
arm.  (Tr., p. 20, L. 18 – p. 21, L. 1; p. 25, L. 25 – p. 26, L. 20.) 
 The home was searched and a variety of drugs and paraphernalia were 
found in Barker’s bedroom. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 5-10; p. 87, L. 20 – p. 100, L. 20.)  An 
officer found a glass pipe, “stuck between some clothes,” in the bedroom closet.  
(Tr., p. 104, Ls. 20-25.)  The officer concluded based on his training that the pipe 
was “used in the smoking of Methamphetamine,” and Barker told the officer that 
 2 
it “was Mr. Anderson’s” pipe.  (Tr., p. 92, L. 23 – p. 93, p. 2; p. 103, Ls. 1-3.)  The 
residue in the pipe later tested positive for methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 143, L. 25 
– p. 144, L. 19; State’s Ex. 5.) 
Two safes were found in the house.  (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 8-10.)  First, there was 
a safe on the floor that Barker was able to open for law enforcement.  (Tr., p. 40, 
Ls. 5-12; p. 45, Ls. 8-18.)  The floor safe contained methadone pills and a jar of 
a green leafy substance. (Tr., p. 45, L. 24 – p. 46, L. 3; p. 88, L. 24 – p. 89, L. 3; 
Defendant’s Ex. A.)  A smaller locked safe, which Barker did not have access to 
(the “lockbox”), was found inside the closet. (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 1-10.) Barker 
explained to the officers that her ex-boyfriend, currently in prison, had the key to 
it. (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 11-14.)  As a result the officers had to pry the lockbox open to 
access it.  (Tr., p. 87, Ls. 13-18.)  Inside the lockbox, the officers found “a cotton 
swab and a spoon with some black residue” on it, a baggie with residue, and a 
baggie with “small white crystals.”  (Tr., p. 87, Ls. 9-18; Defendant’s Exhibit A.)  
The spoon’s residue later tested positive for heroin, and the white crystal in the 
baggie tested positive for methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 138, 18-22; p. 140, Ls. 12-
15; p. 141, Ls. 18-22; State’s Ex. 4.) 
Anderson was charged with possession of methamphetamine and heroin 
in CR-2016-416, and possession of paraphernalia in CR-2016-411.  (R., pp. 60-
61, 211.)1  At trial, Barker testified that Anderson and Bittick arrived at her house 
on approximately February 17 and that the trio used drugs.  (Tr., p. 32, Ls. 8-11; 
                                            
1 Charges alleging that Anderson possessed marijuana and methadone were 
dismissed on the state’s motion prior to trial.  See R., p. 106. 
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p. 35, Ls. 3-5.)  She testified that she “saw [Anderson] using heroin in the living 
room” and maybe the bedroom as well, and that Anderson smoked 
methamphetamine using a glass pipe. (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 10-14; p. 35, L. 24 – p. 36, 
L. 10.)  Barker testified that when police arrived Anderson gathered “all of his 
paraphernalia, the pipe, the spoon” from the living room coffee table and put the 
items in her room in a “scattered” fashion (Tr., p. 37, 16-23; p. 41, L. 24 – p. 43, 
8.)  Barker also testified that she recognized the methamphetamine pipe found in 
the closet as the one that was previously on the coffee table, and that it was 
Anderson’s pipe. (Tr., p. 44, L. 22 – p. 45, L. 7.)  When asked, “did you use both 
Methamphetamine and heroin with Mr. Anderson?,” Barker testified that she did. 
(Tr., p. 47, Ls. 11-13.) 
Bittick similarly testified that after he and Barker picked up Anderson, 
“[w]e did drugs,” and that Anderson used both heroin and methamphetamine.  
(Tr., p. 67, Ls. 9-21; p. 68, Ls. 3-7.)  Bittick testified that Anderson smoked 
methamphetamine specifically with a “glass pipe.”  (Tr., p. 69, L. 15 – p. 70, 
L. 5.) 
The state rested its case and Anderson moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
claiming insufficient evidence for a conviction.  (Tr., p. 148, L. 13 – p. 150, L. 3.)  
Anderson noted that there were three items sent to the state lab for testing: 
1) the baggies with methamphetamine crystals; 2) the heroin in the spoon and 
cotton swab; and 3) the glass pipe with methamphetamine residue found in the 
closet.  (Tr., p. 148, L. 16 – p. 149, L. 10.)  Anderson argued that the 
methamphetamine baggies and the spoon with heroin were found “in a locked 
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safe that no one had access to.”2   (Tr., p. 148, L. 19 – p. 149, L. 4.)  Moreover, 
regarding the methamphetamine pipe, Anderson argued “the only evidence that 
pointed to Mr. Anderson whatsoever of ever having possession” of it was the 
testimony of his “accomplices.”3  (Tr., p. 149, Ls. 7-10.)  Anderson argued that 
his admission of drug use “had nothing to do” with the pipe, and “only was an 
admission to a relapse with heroin.”  (Tr., p. 149, Ls. 20-22 (emphasis added).)  
Thus, he claimed, the testimony regarding the pipe was uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony.  (Tr., p. 149, L. 11 – p. 150, L. 3.) 
                                            
2 Whether the floor safe contained any heroin or methamphetamine was a point 
of confusion at trial.  Barker was asked if there was “a spoon and a cotton swab 
found in” the floor safe—a reference to state’s exhibit 2, a spoon with dark 
residue that tested positive for heroin.  (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 5-7; State’s Exs. 2, 4.)  
Barker initially responded “[y]eah,” the spoon was found in the floor safe.  (See 
Tr., p. 46, Ls. 5-7.)  However, she later testified that she was not sure if the 
cotton was in the spoon, that she “didn’t know what was really in there,” and that 
she did not recognize the spoon and the swab.  (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 7-22.)  Barker 
also testified that she would not know the difference between “a spoon and 
cotton swab that was used by Mr. Anderson and what was used by” herself.  (Tr., 
p. 56, Ls. 21-24.)  By contrast, Officer Toth repeatedly testified that the spoon 
and cotton swab were found inside the lockbox.  (Tr., p. 87, Ls. 9-18; p. 90, L. 21 
– p. 91, L. 2.)  The state stipulated to admit Toth’s report into evidence, and it 
listed “[a] spoon with black tar like material” as part of the lockbox inventory.  
(Defense Ex. A.)  When asked to clarify whether he found any “suspected heroin 
or heroin paraphernalia” in the floor safe Officer Toth stated that he did not.  (Tr., 
p. 89, Ls. 5-9.)  As for methamphetamine, Officer Toth testified that he did not 
recall finding any methamphetamine in the floor safe.  (Tr., p. 89, Ls. 10-15.)  
Toth speculated that there “might” have been “a baggie with some possible 
residue in [the floor safe],” but was not questioned further about this recollection.  
(Tr., p. 89, Ls. 16-19.)  Moreover, Toth’s report stated that baggies containing 
residue and white crystals were found in the lockbox, and not the floor safe.  
(Defense Ex. A.)  Regardless of the contents of the ground safe, there was still 
ample evidence that Anderson possessed the pipe with methamphetamine found 
outside both safes, as explained herein. 
 
3 The district court had granted Anderson’s request that the jury be given an 
accomplice instruction. (See R., pp. 102-03, 116.) 
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The state argued that there was sufficient evidence that corroborated the 
accomplice testimony.  (Tr., p. 150, L. 14 – p. 151, L. 4; see also R., p. 170.)  
Even granting that the methamphetamine baggies and heroin were found in the 
inaccessible lockbox, the state pointed out that the pipe was found outside of the 
lockbox.  (See Tr., p. 152, Ls. 9-13.)  The state argued that in light of the 
corroborated testimony that the pipe belonged to Anderson, there was still 
sufficient evidence to support the methamphetamine possession charge: 
So, I mean, if the baggie of Methamphetamine is thrown out, we 
still have the pipe for the charge of Methamphetamine. However, if 
the heroin charge is dismissed, of course there’s no alternative 
object or evidence in relation to the heroin charge. 
 
(Tr., p. 152, Ls. 9-13.)  The district court took Anderson’s motion under 
advisement (Tr., p. 152, Ls. 14-15), and the jury found Anderson guilty of 
possession of methamphetamine, heroin, and paraphernalia.  (Tr., p. 160, 
Ls. 15-23.)  In post-trial briefing responding to Anderson’s renewed motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, the state argued that there was corroborating evidence 
supporting both the conviction for heroin possession and the conviction for 
methamphetamine possession.  (See Tr., p. 157, Ls. 12-20; R. p. 170.) 
The district court granted Anderson’s renewed motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.  (R., pp. 175-82.)  In doing so the court adopted much of Anderson’s 
argument in favor of acquittal; it found that there was no evidence that 
corroborated Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony against Anderson.  (R., p. 181.)  In 
particular, the district court noted that “Anderson’s admission of heroin use and 
the ‘track marks’ located on his arm could potentially corroborate the accomplice 
testimony regarding possession of heroin, except that the heroin admitted at trial 
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was recovered from a lockbox in Barker’s closet that had to be forced open 
because no one had a key to it.”  (R., p. 181.)  With respect to the 
methamphetamine pipe, the court found “[t]here is nothing about the discovery of 
the meth pipe that links Anderson specifically to being in possession of it.” 
(R., pp. 181, 244.)  The district court concluded: 
Similar to State v. Dietrich [135 Idaho 870, 26 P.3d 53 (Ct. App. 
2001)], the only evidence linking Anderson to possession of the 
controlled substances and possession of paraphernalia was the 
testimony of Barker and Bittick claiming that Anderson brought the 
heroin to the residence, injected heroin while at the residence, 
smoked meth, owned the meth pipe, and stashed some of the 
illegal items in their bedroom. Because there is no evidence to 
corroborate the testimony of Barker and Bittick linking Anderson to 
the crimes, the evidence is insufficient to sustain Anderson’s 
convictions. 
 
(R., p. 181.)  The district court granted Anderson’s motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.  (R., pp. 182.)  The state timely appealed in case numbers 411 and 






Did the district court erroneously find that there was no evidence to corroborate 
Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony, and therefore erroneously conclude there was 






Because There Was Ample Evidence That Corroborated Barker’s and Bittick’s 
Testimony, The District Court Erroneously Concluded That There Was 
Insufficient Evidence To Sustain Anderson’s Convictions 
 
A. Introduction 
 Anderson moved the district court for a judgment of acquittal of the jury’s 
guilty verdict.  (R., pp. 162-66.)  The court granted that motion, finding “the only 
evidence linking Anderson to possession of the controlled substances and 
possession of paraphernalia” was the testimony of his accomplices, Barker and 
Bittick.  (R., p. 181.)  But this was an error, as there was ample corroboration of 
Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony—the track marks on Anderson’s arm, the timing 
of his admitted relapse, and his own admissions that he used drugs while staying 
with Barker and Bittick.  Because substantial, competent evidence supported the 
jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson was guilty of possession 
of methamphetamine, heroin, and paraphernalia, the district court erred by 
granting Anderson’s motion to overturn the jury’s verdict.4  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 In reviewing a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal, this Court looks to “whether 
there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Hoyle, 
                                            
4 The state also contends that even assuming, arguendo, there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for possession of the heroin found within the 
lockbox, there was nevertheless ample evidence to support a conviction for 




140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004); see State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007); see State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  This Court views the evidence “in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of 
the jury regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  Oliver, 144 Idaho at 
724, 170 P.3d at 387; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 
1991); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).  
The facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are therefore construed 
in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict.  See Oliver, 144 Idaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 
387; see also Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.  Consequently, “[w]here 
there is competent although conflicting evidence to sustain the verdict, this court 
cannot reweigh that evidence or disturb the verdict.”  State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 
642, 644-45, 962 P.2d 1026, 1028–29 (2002); Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 684, 99 P.3d 
at 1074. 
C. The Timing Of Anderson’s Relapse, The Track Marks On His Arm, And 
Anderson’s Own Statements About His Drug Use While In Barker’s House 
Corroborated Barker’s And Bittick’s Testimony 
 
Idaho Code § 19-2117 provides: 
 
A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, 
unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and 
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of 
the offense, or the circumstances thereof. 
 
The purpose of requiring corroborating evidence is “to offset the danger that an 
accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony inculpating an innocent person in 
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order to win more lenient treatment” from the state.  State v. Campbell, 
114 Idaho 367, 369, 757 P.2d 230, 232 (Ct. App. 1988).  While the corroborating 
evidence must be independent of accomplice testimony “it need not be sufficient 
in and of itself” to sustain a conviction.  Id. at 369-70, 757 P.2d at 232; State v. 
Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 364, 690 P.2d 293, 299 (1984).  In fact, “[t]he 
corroborating evidence may be slight, need only go to one material fact and may 
be entirely circumstantial.”  Campbell, 114 Idaho at 370, 757 P.2d at 232; State 
v. Evans, 102 Idaho 461, 463, 631 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1981); State v. Brown, 
53 Idaho 576, 581, 26 P.2d 131, 133 (1933).  A defendant’s own statements 
“may supply the corroboration of an accomplice that is necessary for conviction.”  
Campbell, 114 Idaho at 370, 757 P.2d at 232; State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 
385, 630 P.2d 665, 672 (1981).  Lastly, corroborating evidence need not 
corroborate “every detail of the accomplice’s testimony.”  State v. Stone, 
147 Idaho 890, 891, 216 P.3d 648, 649 (Ct. App. 2009);  State v. Mitchell, 
146 Idaho 378, 382, 195 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 The Idaho Court of Appeals has shown that even “threadbare,” inferential 
evidence will satisfy the corroboration requirement.  See Stone, 147 Idaho at 
892, 216 P.3d at 651.  In Stone, the defendant was one of four men charged in 
connection with a violent robbery.  Id. at 891, 216 P.3d at 649.  The state alleged 
that Stone chauffeured the assailants and helped plan the attack.  Id.  At trial, 
the victim did not provide testimony specifically pertaining to Stone, but, an 
accomplice to the crime testified that Stone was “present during conversations” 
in which the attack was planned and “drove the vehicle to and from the 
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apartment” of the victim.  Id. at 892, 216 P.3d at 650. The state’s non-accomplice 
evidence against Stone was therefore limited to one individual: a detective who 
interviewed Stone five months after the incident.  Id. 
The detective testified that he met with Stone and told him he wanted to 
interview him about an incident in Blackfoot.  Id.  Stone replied that he had not 
been in Blackfoot “and that the only thing [Stone] was aware of was what he had 
seen on the news regarding [accomplices] Bailey and Wall.”  Id.  This slip-up was 
a clue: as the district court noted, the detective “did not mention names, Stone 
brought them up.”  Id.  The detective then told Stone that someone “was 
cooperating with the police, the police knew Stone was involved, and Stone 
could probably get the same deal” as the cooperator “if Stone would cooperate” 
too.  Id.  Stone backpedaled, conceding now that “he had, in fact, been in 
Blackfoot, but that all he knew was that the incident occurred because ‘a guy 
owed somebody some money,’” which, claimed Stone, he “learned from the 
news.”  Id. 
The district court found Stone’s cryptic statements, while “certainly 
tenuous,” were nevertheless sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony: 
Although the corroborating evidence is threadbare, this Court finds 
that the inferences therefrom tend to connect Stone to the crime. If, 
as Stone seemed to indicate to [the detective], Stone was merely a 
casual observer of a news story, it seems unlikely that Stone would 
recall the names of the perpetrators five months after the crime, 
and the subsequent news story, became public information. In 
addition, Stone’s sudden change in recollection, when [the 
detective] told Stone that he could receive more favorable 
treatment like the cooperating individual if Stone would cooperate 
with the police, is at odds with someone who had absolutely no 
connection, other than as a recipient of a news story, to a criminal 
act. Reasonable minds can infer from Stone’s statements to 
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Cronquist that Stone knew more about the incident than he was 
willing to reveal…. 
 
Id. at 892-93, 216 P.3d at 650-51. 
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed that the corroborating 
evidence against Stone—inferential and meager though it was—was enough: 
We agree with the district court’s characterization of both the 
strength and sufficiency of the corroborative evidence. As noted, 
corroborative testimony may be “slight” and need only “tend” to 
connect the defendant to the crime. Stone’s unsolicited knowledge 
of the names of the individuals involved, and the motive for the 
crime, could reasonably be inferred to indicate more involvement 
than a passive recipient of news. Even a highly plausible innocent 
explanation of the evidence “does not strip the evidence of its 
corroborative character.” Moreover, one is entitled to reasonably 
question why Stone would initially claim not to be in Blackfoot and 
then change his story if he had no connection at all to the incident. 
 
Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651.  The Stone Court accordingly found that “[s]ufficient 
corroborative evidence was presented at trial to sustain the verdicts,” and 
affirmed.  Id. 
 Here, there was ample evidence that corroborated Anderson’s 
accomplices’ testimony.  Anderson had track marks on his arm, which indicated 
illegal drug use in general, and was potential evidence of methamphetamine or 
heroin use.  (See Tr., p. 20, L. 15 – p. 21, L. 1; p. 26, Ls. 4-20.)  Moreover, 
Anderson’s own statements to his probation officer corroborated that he had 
been at Barker’s house and relapsed with heroin on February 17.  (Tr., p. 10, 
Ls. 11-15; p. 27, Ls. 18-25.)  This is the same timeframe in which his 
accomplices testified he was present, using drugs with them.  (Tr., p. 32, Ls. 8-
13; p. 66, L. 24 – p. 67, L. 3; p. 67, Ls. 9-14; p. 74, 21-23.) 
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Finally, Anderson corroborated his accomplices’ statements that he was 
using drugs with them.  When Barker was asked “did you use both 
Methamphetamine and heroin with Mr. Anderson” she testified that she did.  (Tr., 
p. 47, Ls. 11-13 (emphasis added).)  Bittick similarly testified that “We did drugs,” 
that “Meth and heroin” were the drugs of choice, and that Anderson both 
smoked methamphetamine and used heroin.  (Tr., p. 67, L. 12 – p. 69, L. 17 
(emphasis added).)  Anderson corroborated both accomplices’ testimony in his 
statements to Galloway: 
Q: And what inquiry as to [Anderson’s] activities did you make with 
Mr. Anderson? 
 
A: I asked him how long he had been there. And he told me he’d 
been there approximately three days. I asked him what he was 
doing. I asked him what his activities were. And he told me he had 
been using heroin. 
 
(Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-15 (emphasis added).)  Further, Anderson did not deny using 
methamphetamine, nor did he say that he only used heroin.  (See Tr., p. 10, 
Ls. 9-15.)  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
and construing inferences in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, Anderson’s 
confirmation that he used heroin is more than sufficient to corroborate Barker’s 
and Bittick’s testimony about his drug use—that Anderson used both heroin and 
methamphetamine. 
The Stone holding affirms that the corroborative evidence here was more 
than sufficient.  Per Stone, even threadbare evidence can be corroborative 
notwithstanding a “highly plausible innocent explanation” for it.  147 Idaho at 
892-93, 216 P.3d at 651-52.  Here, the corroborating evidence was ample, went 
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to multiple material facts, and had no innocent explanation—Anderson openly 
admitted to illegal drug use during the time and at the place in question.  (Tr., 
p. 10, Ls. 9-15.)  Furthermore, the Stone Court found that a factfinder can draw 
reasonable inferences from the corroborative evidence before it.  See 147 Idaho 
at 893, 216 P.3d at 652.  It is an entirely reasonable inference that because 
Anderson admitted to using heroin at Barker’s house—and did not disclaim that 
he used only heroin—that he not only used heroin, but participated in the 
methamphetamine use that contemporaneously occurred there. 
The district court concluded otherwise, finding that Anderson’s statements 
regarding heroin use and the track marks on his arm “could potentially 
corroborate the accomplice testimony regarding possession of heroin, except 
that the heroin admitted at trial was recovered from a lockbox in Barker’s closet 
that had to be forced open because no one had a key to it.”  (R., p. 181.)  With 
respect to the methamphetamine pipe—found outside the lockbox—the court 
concluded that “[t]here is nothing about the discovery of the meth pipe that links 
Anderson specifically to being in possession of it.”  (R., p. 181.)  In other words, 
the district court found that Anderson’s statements about heroin use 
corroborated nothing—because the heroin found by police in the lockbox was 
inaccessible, and because heroin is not the same substance as 
methamphetamine.  (See R., p. 181.) 
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But even granting that Anderson could not have possessed the lockbox 
items,5 the district court set an erroneously high bar by completely disregarding 
Anderson’s admissions and track marks—both with respect to the heroin charge, 
and the methamphetamine charge.  Regarding the heroin charge, the 
eyewitness testimony of two accomplices, combined with Anderson’s admission 
of using heroin, and the evidence of track marks on his arm, were sufficient to 
support his conviction for possessing heroin other than that found in the lockbox.   
In addition, with respect to the methamphetamine charge, ignoring 
Anderson’s heroin admissions goes contrary to the expansive analysis in Stone.  
In that case there was nothing about Stone’s mere knowledge of the 
accomplices’ names or newsworthy facts of the case that personally linked him 
to participating in the multiple crimes they committed.  Nor was there anything 
about Stone changing his story about simply being in Blackfoot that connected 
him to any event whatsoever, let alone specifically connected him to the 
particular crimes at issue.  Nevertheless, the Stone Court, proceeding entirely 
inferentially, deduced that Stone’s knowledge alone “could reasonably be 
inferred to indicate more involvement than a passive recipient of news,” and that 
“one is entitled to reasonably question” why a person would change an 
otherwise-innocuous story if “he had no connection at all to the incident.” 
                                            
5 As alluded to below, the state concedes on appeal that there was insufficient 
evidence to show that Anderson—or for that matter anyone other than Barker’s 
imprisoned boyfriend—could access the heroin found in the lockbox.  (See Tr., 
p. 152, Ls. 9-13.)  However, as argued below and herein, this has no bearing on 
the methamphetamine pipe found outside the lockbox, which ample evidence 
shows Anderson possessed.  Nor does it disprove or otherwise foreclose 
possession of heroin other than that found in the lockbox. 
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147 Idaho at 893, 216 P.3d at 651.  If inferences that far-reaching and tenuous 
are permissible, one would easily be entitled to question why Anderson would 
affirm using some drugs if he “had no connection at all” to the rest of the illegal 
drug use taking place at the same time, in the same house, and with the same 
parties.  Given the logic of Stone, one can readily and reasonably infer from 
Anderson’s heroin admissions that he also used methamphetamine. 
The district court’s reliance on State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 26 P.3d 
53 (Ct. App. 2001), was also misplaced.  In Dietrich, the defendant was charged 
with five counts of burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary.  Id. at 871, 
26 P.3d at 54.  The sole physical evidence tying the defendant to the crimes was 
a Magnavox box recovered from the house that the defendant and his 
accomplices lived in.  Id. at 871, 874, 26 P.3d at 54, 57. One of Dietrich’s 
accomplices testified that the box was used to carry stolen equipment.  Id. at 
871-72, 26 P.3d at 54-55.  However, the court noted that the box could not be 
non-accomplice evidence because “the box itself is linked to the burglary only by 
[an accomplice’s] testimony.”  Id. at 874, 26 P.3d at 57.  Moreover, the court 
noted arguendo that “[e]ven if there was corroboration that the box came from 
the burglarized house, discovery of the box in the apartment where Dietrich 
resided would not seem to connect Dietrich to the crime because [the 
accomplice] also resided in the same apartment.”  Id. at 874, 26 P.3d at 57, n. 2.  
The Dietrich Court therefore held that “there was no physical evidence nor 
testimony from any person other than [an accomplice] that indicates Dietrich was 
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involved in these burglaries or the associated conspiracy.”  Id. at 874, 26 P.3d at 
57. 
Dietrich is readily distinguishable from this case, because Anderson 
himself admitted to participating in illegal drug use while he stayed at the 
apartment.  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-15.)  Unlike the Magnavox box in Dietrich—which 
carried legal significance only because of the accomplice testimony—Anderson’s 
track marks and admissions of drug use are self-evidently significant, plainly 
bearing on the question of whether he used and possessed drugs other than 
those found in the lockbox while he was there.  Because Anderson himself bore 
physiological signs of drug use, and admitted to using illegal drugs at the time 
and place in question, Dietrich is inapplicable. 
Because the district court erroneously found that Barker’s and Bittick’s 
testimony was not corroborated, it incorrectly concluded the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain Anderson’s convictions for possession of heroin, 
methamphetamine, and paraphernalia.  Construing the facts and inferences in 
favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, the jury correctly found that the evidence 






 The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the order of the district 
court and remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 9th day of May, 2017. 
 
       
 __/s/ Kale D. Gans_________ 
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